Module 13 · Case Studies¶
What this module does. Puts everything from Modules 00–12 to work on 25 real decisions — ten global and fifteen Indian — each frozen at a date when a thoughtful investor had to act with only the information then public. You read the scene and the numbers, answer the questions before reading what happened, and then compare your reasoning with the outcome, the model answers and the signals that were knowable at the time.
Why it matters. Frameworks are easy to agree with and hard to apply. Cases are where you find out whether you can spot a fictitious cash balance, price a tax risk, value a lender, survive a cyclical trough or resist a great company at a bad price — with a real share price in front of you and no hindsight. They are also the fastest way to build pattern recognition: the same handful of mistakes and signals recur across countries and decades.
How to use a case¶
- Respect the decision date. Sections 1–3 contain only what was public at the time. Do not look up the company.
- Answer section 3 in writing, with numbers, before reading on. Time-box it (the "Time" row gives a guide; about
half of it goes on sections 1–3). Use the course tools (
fi.valuation,fi.forensics) or a spreadsheet. - Write a decision-journal entry (11.6): buy, avoid or short; size; confidence; what would change your mind. Keep it — the casebook template works.
- Read section 4 (what happened) and section 5 (knowable vs hindsight) and score yourself honestly: right for the right reasons, right for the wrong reasons, wrong for the right reasons, or wrong.
- Only then open the model answers (section 7). Where your numbers differ, find out why.
- Do one discussion question from section 8; several point to a live company you can analyse today.
Two decision points
Many Indian cases have two decision dates (A and B) years apart, often at opposite ends of a cycle or a re-rating. Do decision A completely — including your journal entry — before reading decision B's scene.
The 25 cases¶
Global¶
| # | Case | Period | Decision date(s) | Main themes | Difficulty | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| G1 | See's Candies (1972) | 1971–2014 | Dec-1971 | Pricing power, capital-light compounding, return on incremental capital | ★★☆ | 2.5 h |
| G2 | Buffett buys Coca-Cola (1988) | 1981–2014 | 31-Jan-1989; 15-Jul-1998 | Moat + reinvestment + fair price; owner earnings; valuation risk in great companies | ★★☆ | 2.5 h |
| G3 | Cisco at the dot-com peak (2000) | 1995–2026 | 27-Mar-2000 | Reverse DCF of a bubble; great company ≠ great investment | ★★★ | 3 h |
| G4 | Enron (2001) | 1996–2013 | 2-Apr-2001 | Mark-to-market earnings, SPEs, cash flow ≠ earnings, gatekeepers | ★★★★ | 3–4 h |
| G5 | Amazon (1997–2015) | 1997–2015 | 19-Apr-2002 | Negative working capital, FCF vs EPS, long-duration value | ★★★ | 3.5 h |
| G6 | Lehman Brothers (2008) | 2003–2025 | 16-Jun-2008 | Leverage, Level 3, repo funding, liquidity vs solvency | ★★★★ | 3.5 h |
| G7 | Nokia & BlackBerry (2007–2013) | 2007–2016 | 30-Jun-2011 | Moat erosion, platform shifts, value traps | ★★★ | 3 h |
| G8 | Valeant (2015) | 2010–2026 | 5-Aug-2015 | Roll-up economics, adjusted metrics, debt, short sellers | ★★★★ | 3 h |
| G9 | Wirecard (2020) | 2014–2026 | 31-Dec-2019 | Cash that cannot be verified, third-party profits, auditor and regulator failure | ★★★★ | 3 h |
| G10 | Buffett buys Apple (2016) | 2013–2026 | 16-May-2016 | Consumer franchise vs "hardware"; buybacks; re-rating; trimming a winner | ★★★ | 2.5 h |
India¶
| # | Case | Period | Decision date(s) | Main themes | Difficulty | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I1 | Satyam Computer Services (2009) | 2004–2018 | 6-Jan-2009 | Fictitious cash, the interest-income test, related-party deals, pledges | ★★★ | 2.5 h |
| I2 | Asian Paints | 2002–2026 | 31-Mar-2011; 31-Mar-2022 | Distribution moat, working capital, quality at a price, a funded entrant | ★★★ | 3 h |
| I3 | Bajaj Finance | 2007–2026 | 20-May-2010; 31-Mar-2019 | RoA × leverage, credit cost, cross-sell, P/B as a forecast of RoE | ★★★ | 3 h |
| I4 | IL&FS and DHFL (2018–2019) | 2009–2026 | 31-Aug-2018; 24-Sep-2018 | ALM mismatch, CP rollover, rating lag, debt-fund contagion | ★★★★ | 3 h |
| I5 | Yes Bank (2018–2020) | 2013–2026 | 20-Aug-2018; 31-Dec-2019 | NPA divergence, concentrated lending, AT1, bail-out | ★★★★ | 3 h |
| I6 | Eicher Motors (2009–2019) | 2005–2026 | 15-Feb-2010; 31-Oct-2017 | Focus, operating leverage, re-rating and de-rating | ★★★ | 3 h |
| I7 | HDFC Bank (1995–2024) | 2000–2026 | 26-Apr-2010; 4-Apr-2022 | Consistency premium, deposit franchise, merger arithmetic | ★★★ | 3 h |
| I8 | Zomato & Paytm IPOs (2021) | 2019–2026 | 14-Jul-2021; 8-Nov-2021 | Valuing loss-making platforms, unit economics, regulatory risk | ★★★ | 3 h |
| I9 | Adani–Hindenburg (2023) | 2016–2026 | 27-Jan-2023 | Reading a short report; allegation vs finding; leverage and pledges | ★★★★ | 3 h |
| I10 | Vodafone Idea & the telecom war | 2012–2026 | 6-Sep-2016; 24-Oct-2019 | Capital cycle, price war, spectrum and AGR as debt | ★★★★ | 3 h |
| I11 | Kingfisher & Jet Airways | 2006–2026 | 8-Apr-2011; 28-Aug-2018 | RASK vs CASK, leases, leverage, lender "premiums" | ★★★ | 3 h |
| I12 | ITC | 2013–2026 | 30-Oct-2020; 14-Aug-2023 | Cheap for a reason?, SOTP, sin-tax risk, payout, demerger | ★★★ | 3 h |
| I13 | Avenue Supermarts / DMart | 2012–2026 | 21-Mar-2017; 14-Oct-2021 | EDLC/EDLP, owned stores and ROCE, the most expensive share | ★★★ | 3 h |
| I14 | Manpasand & Vakrangee (2017–2018) | 2014–2026 | 25-Jan-2018 | Small-cap red flags, auditor resignations, sizing under Amber evidence | ★★★ | 2.5 h |
| I15 | Tata Motors & JLR | 2004–2026 | 9-Mar-2009; 11-Feb-2019 | Cyclical troughs, acquisition leverage, currency, demerger | ★★★ | 3 h |
Theme × case matrix¶
● = a central theme of the case; ○ = a secondary theme.
| Case | Fraud & forensics | Lenders, ALM & credit | Moats & compounding | Valuation vs price | Capital cycle & competition | Governance & promoters | Regulation & policy | Special situations & restructuring | Cycles & macro | Loss-making growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| G1 See's | ● | ● | ○ | |||||||
| G2 Coca-Cola | ● | ● | ||||||||
| G3 Cisco | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | |||||
| G4 Enron | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | |||||
| G5 Amazon | ● | ● | ● | |||||||
| G6 Lehman | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ||||
| G7 Nokia/BB | ● | ● | ● | |||||||
| G8 Valeant | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | |||||
| G9 Wirecard | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ||||||
| G10 Apple | ● | ● | ○ | |||||||
| I1 Satyam | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | |||||
| I2 Asian Paints | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ||||||
| I3 Bajaj Finance | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ||||
| I4 IL&FS/DHFL | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ||||
| I5 Yes Bank | ○ | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ||||
| I6 Eicher | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | |||||
| I7 HDFC Bank | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ||||
| I8 Zomato/Paytm | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ||||
| I9 Adani | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | |||||
| I10 Vodafone Idea | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | |||
| I11 Kingfisher/Jet | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ||
| I12 ITC | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | |||||
| I13 DMart | ● | ● | ● | |||||||
| I14 Manpasand/Vakrangee | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | |||||
| I15 Tata Motors | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● |
Patterns across cases¶
- Cash earns interest; check the yield. Satyam's ₹5,000 crore and Wirecard's €2 billion of "cash" earned far less than the deposits they supposedly were. The yield test takes two minutes. → I1 · G9 · 09.4
- Companies with surplus cash do not borrow — and their promoters do not pledge everything. Satyam borrowed while "cash-rich"; Wirecard kept raising debt and a convertible; Satyam's and several other promoters' pledges were margin-called. → I1 · G9 · I9
- Find where the profit comes from. Enron's mark-to-market gains, Valeant's "cash EPS", Wirecard's third-party acquirers, Vakrangee's low-margin revenue surge and Jet's asset-sale "other income" each hid how little the core business earned. → G4 · G8 · G9 · I11 · I14
- Liquidity kills before solvency. Lehman, IL&FS and DHFL, Jet Airways and Tata Motors in 2009 all faced the same question — can the debt due in the next twelve months be rolled? The asset side decided who deserved to survive; the liability side decided who did. → G6 · I4 · I11 · I15 · I3
- A great company is not a great investment at any price. Cisco at 230× earnings, Coca-Cola in 1998, Asian Paints at 97× and DMart at its peak all delivered business growth and poor or negative returns for years. → G3 · G2 · I2 · I13
- Decompose every past return into earnings growth and re-rating. Asian Paints' 25% a year (2011–22), Bajaj Finance's 62% (2010–19) and ITC's 47% (2020–23) came roughly half to two-thirds from re-rating — the part that cannot repeat and often reverses. → I2 · I3 · I12 · G10
- High returns attract capital; the capital cycle eventually arrives. Jio in telecom, Birla Opus in paints, IndiGo in aviation, Juniper against Cisco, the iPhone against Nokia and BlackBerry. The announcement usually comes years before the damage — and the stock often ignores it. → I10 · I2 · I11 · G7
- Gatekeepers certify what they test. Big Four auditors (Satyam, Wirecard, Vakrangee, Manpasand), rating agencies (IL&FS, Enron), regulators (BaFin) and governance awards all failed to catch problems outside their procedures. An auditor's resignation is the most important governance signal in Indian small caps. → I1 · G9 · I4 · I14
- At the trough, value the troubled piece by subtraction. Tata Motors in 2009 priced JLR's equity near zero; Nokia's patents and net cash set a floor; ITC's cigarette business was priced at 6.5× EBITDA once the rest was valued. → I15 · G7 · I12
- Lenders are RoA × leverage, and the equity owns the variance of credit cost. Bajaj Finance, HDFC Bank, Yes Bank and DHFL differ less in their stated strategy than in how their credit cost and funding behaved under stress. → I3 · I7 · I5 · I4
- Allegations are not findings — in either direction. Hindenburg's allegations against Adani, the claims against Vakrangee's trading and the promoters of Jet and Kingfisher each led to different official outcomes. Precision about what was found protects you from over- and under-reacting. → I9 · I14 · I11
- Size for the tail you cannot hedge. Governance jumps, tax changes, regulatory orders and operational shocks (a cyberattack at JLR, the RBI's embargo on Bajaj Finance, the excise on ITC) sit outside most models. The answer is position size, not prediction. → 11.4
Suggested tracks¶
| Track | Order | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Forensics | I1 → G9 → G4 → I14 → G8 → I9 | From the simplest fictitious-cash test to reading a contested short-seller report |
| Lenders | I3 → I7 → I5 → I4 → G6 | Build lender economics on a winner, then study the failures |
| Quality & price | G1 → G2 → I2 → I13 → G3 → G10 | Great businesses at good, fair and absurd prices |
| Cycles & balance sheets | I15 → I11 → I10 → G6 → I6 | Leverage, operating leverage and the capital cycle |
| India-first | I1 → I3 → I2 → I12 → I4 → I14 → I15 → I9 | One pass through the Indian market's main lessons |
| Growth & new economy | G5 → I8 → G7 → I6 | Valuing loss-making or fast-changing businesses |
Connections¶
- Back: every module. Cases most reinforce 04 Financial analysis, 05 Business analysis, 06 Valuation, 07 Special valuation, 09 Forensics and 11 Process.
- Forward: Module 14 mocks include a timed case on a new fictional company, and the Module 15 capstone asks you to write your own case studies in the same format, in the private casebook.
You're ready to move on when you can…¶
- Work a case from the scene to a written decision with a size and a journal entry, without looking ahead.
- Run the interest-income, borrowing and "where does the profit come from" tests on any company in 30 minutes.
- Reverse-engineer what a price implies (growth, RoE, the value of a troubled segment) and say whether it can happen.
- Decompose a historical return into earnings growth, re-rating and dividends.
- Tell a liquidity problem from a solvency problem, and a cyclical trough from a structural decline.
- State precisely what regulators and courts have found in a contested case, and what remains alleged.
- Explain, for any case, which signals were knowable at the time and which only in hindsight.
Tested by: the final exam (a timed case) and the stock-pitch mock.